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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Tamra Robinson was told by her manager Karen Garrett 
that her work performance was so poor that “you either don’t 
know what you’re doing, or you have a disability, or [you’re] 
dyslexic.”  Taking Garrett’s words seriously, Robinson, who 
had never before considered the possibility she might have a 
disability, decided to undergo testing for dyslexia.  She sent 
Garrett an evaluation that concluded that Robinson had 
symptoms consistent with dyslexia, and requested certain 
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accommodations from the manager of human resources.  She 
was told that any diagnosis she received would not prevent her 
from performing her work in a satisfactory matter, and she was 
advised to focus on improving her performance.  Weeks later, 
she was fired. 
 
 During the litigation in the District Court between 
Robinson and her former employer, First State Community 
Action Agency, Robinson acknowledged that she could not 
prove she was dyslexic.  She proceeded on a different theory, 
that she was perceived or regarded as dyslexic by her employer 
and was therefore entitled to a reasonable accommodation the 
same way someone who was dyslexic would have been.  While 
we have previously recognized the validity of a “regarded as” 
disability case theory in cases arising under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,1 the ADA Amendments Act of 20082 made 
clear that a “regarded as” plaintiff is not statutorily entitled to 
accommodation.3  Despite this, both parties proceeded under 
the “regarded as” case theory throughout litigation, trial, and 
post-trial briefing.  Only now does First State seek to unring 
the bell and overturn the jury’s verdict because the jury was 
instructed that the “regarded as” case theory was valid.  We 
hold that First State has waived this argument because of its 
continued acquiescence to Robinson’s case theory, its 
encouragement of the adoption of the very jury instruction to 
which it now objects, and its failure to include this error in its 
post-trial briefing.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.  
                                              
1 Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 
775 (3d Cir. 2004). 
2 Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6, 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 (2008). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h). 
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 Background 
 
A. Robinson’s Employment at First State 
 
In October 2009, Tamra Robinson was hired by First 
State Community Action Agency (“First State”) as an 
individual development account counselor.4  Almost two years 
later, First State hired Karen Garrett, and Garrett became 
Robinson’s supervisor.  Garett was dissatisfied with 
Robinson’s work, and in November 2011, Garrett told 
Robinson “you either don’t know what you’re doing, or you 
have a disability, or [you’re] dyslexic.”5  
  
Robinson had never before considered whether she had 
any kind of disability.  She attempted to find a physician to 
conduct an evaluation for dyslexia, and ultimately reached out 
to a family friend, Dr. Phyllis Parker, who was a psychologist. 
After undergoing testing in January 2012, Robinson received 
an evaluation from Dr. Parker noting that she demonstrated 
“signs of dyslexia,” but this evaluation did not diagnose her 
with the disorder.6  She immediately forwarded it to Garrett. 
 
While Robinson was undergoing this process, Garrett 
completed a performance appraisal for Robinson.  On January 
12, 2012, she placed Robinson on an individual development 
plan addressing six areas of concern.  The plan provided for 
biweekly reviews of Robinson’s progress followed by a final 
evaluation in March of that year.  Garrett received Dr. Parker’s 
                                              
4 About a year later, she was transitioned into the position of 
housing default counselor.  
5 J.A. 65. 
6 J.A. 75. 
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evaluation just six days after completing the development plan.  
She forwarded it to First State’s Human Resources Director, 
David Bull.  Bull emailed Robinson, informing her that he 
received a copy of her “Informal Dyslexia Screening.”7 
Nevertheless, he told Robinson that he did not believe the 
diagnostic information contained in the evaluation would 
“impact[] [Robinson’s] ability to perform the essential 
elements of [her] job responsibilities” and instructed her to 
follow the individual development plan.8  The next day, 
Robinson wrote back and asked for “reasonable 
accommodations”—specifically, she asked for “hands-on 
organized training for the types of clients” she would be 
responsible for counseling.9  Bull replied by saying, “I fully 
understand and know ADA.  What you need to do is your 
job.”10  A few weeks later, Robinson was fired.  
  
B. Proceedings Below 
 
In 2014, Robinson filed the instant suit against First 
State alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.  Since at least the summary judgment stage, she argued 
that First State wrongfully terminated her and wrongfully 
denied her reasonable accommodations, both because she 
actually possessed a disability (dyslexia) and because First 
State regarded her as dyslexic.11  The dispute between 
                                              
7 J.A. 253.  
8 Id.  
9 J.A. 250. 
10 J.A. 252. 
11 See Opening Brief in Support of Robinson’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment (“Robinson SJ Br.”) (Doc. 48) at 8, 
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Robinson and First State proceeded to trial, and Robinson 
prevailed on her reasonable accommodation claim but not her 
termination claim.  First State then moved for a new trial, and 
cited two alleged errors during the course of the trial. 
 
First, during Robinson’s direct examination, she 
testified that after being terminated, she filed a complaint with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which, she 
further testified, ruled in her favor.  At sidebar, counsel for First 
State objected and requested a mistrial.  The District Court 
instead struck the response, informing the jury: 
 
Members of the jury, [you] may recall at the 
beginning of the trial, that I might have to strike 
some testimony, and tell you to disregard what 
you heard. 
 
That last question and answer, I am striking that 
testimony, and you have to disregard what you 
heard.  You cannot rely on it for anything. You 
need to put it out of your mind.12 
                                              
Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 14 Civ. 1205 
(RGA) (D. Del. 2014). 
12 J.A. 132.  Later, the District Court further explained the 
ruling outside the presence of the jury, noting that it did not 
find an intentional violation of the rule against the improper 
introduction of evidence.   The District Court also referenced a 
Seventh Circuit case, Wilson v. Groaning, 25 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 
1994), which concluded that the improper admission of 
testimony was sufficiently cured by the trial court’s prompt 
decision to strike the testimony and instruct the jury to 
disregard it.   
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 In its post-trial decision, the District Court maintained 
that striking the testimony was a sufficient response to the 
inadmissible evidence because juries are presumed to follow a 
court’s instructions, and the split verdict showed that they were 
not unduly swayed by the testimony. 
 
 Second, the District Court mentioned the statutory 
damage cap for Robinson’s claims in its jury instructions.13  
After trial, the District Court agreed that the instruction was 
error, but determined that because First State did not object at 
trial and the error was harmless, it did not merit a new trial. 
 
 First State now appeals that decision, arguing that it 
merits a new trial both because of the stricken testimony about 
the Commission’s finding and because of the erroneous 
damages cap instruction.  First State also argues, for the first 
time, that the judgment below should be vacated because 
Robinson’s “regarded as” disabled case theory was precluded 
by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.14  
                                              
13 The Court informed the jury that “[t]he total amount of 
compensatory and punitive damages combined you can award 
in this case is $50,000.”  J.A. 389. 
14 First State styles this objection as one regarding the District 
Court’s jury instructions.  The District Court instructed the jury 
on Robinson’s reasonable accommodation claim as follows:  
“You can find that First State breached its duty to provide 
reasonable accommodations because it failed to engage in an 
interactive process if Ms. Robinson proves four things:  First, 
First State regarded Ms. Robinson as dyslexic.  Second, Ms. 
Robinson requested accommodation or assistance.  Third, First 
State did not make a good faith effort to assist Ms. Robinson 
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 Discussion 
 
A. The 2008 Amendments 
 
In 2008, the Americans with Disabilities Act was 
amended.  The Act now provides that employers “need not 
provide a reasonable accommodation . . . to an individual who 
meets the definition of disability in [Section 12102(1)(C)].”15  
That Section, in turn, includes the definition of individuals who 
are “regarded as having” a physical or mental impairment.16  In 
other words, after the 2008 Amendments went into effect, an 
individual who demonstrates that she is “regarded as” disabled, 
but who fails to demonstrate that she is actually disabled, is not 
entitled to a reasonable accommodation.17  Therefore, the 
reasonable accommodation jury instruction, which informed 
the members of the jury that they needed to find only that First 
State “regarded Ms. Robinson as dyslexic,”18 was error. 
 
The question before us is whether to review this error 
under the strict plain error standard or whether to treat the 
                                              
in seeking accommodations; and fourth, Ms. Robinson could 
have reasonably been accommodated but for First State’s lack 
of good faith.”  J.A. 384. 
15 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). 
17 See Powers v. USF Holland, Inc., 667 F.3d 815, 823 n.7 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he ADAAA clarified that an individual 
‘regarded as’ disabled (as opposed to actually disabled) is not 
entitled to a ‘reasonable accommodation.’”).  We have also 
made this point in prior decisions.  See, e.g., Hohider v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 188 n.17 (3d Cir. 2009).  
18 J.A. 384. 
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objection as waived.  Despite the fact that Robinson discussed 
her position that she need only prove she was regarded as 
dyslexic as early as 2016, when she filed her motion for 
summary judgment, First State never addressed the effect of 
the 2008 Amendments until its briefing before this Court.  It 
contends that its failure to raise this argument is best 
understood as a failure to object to an erroneous jury 
instruction and should therefore be reviewed under our plain 
error standard.  We disagree because, although First State 
focuses narrowly on how this error manifested in the jury 
instructions, it was more broadly a flaw in Robinson’s theory 
of the case that dated back to summary judgment briefing, and 
First State at no time objected to that theory despite numerous 
opportunities to do so.  Thus, we view the argument as waived, 
and we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. 
 
1. Forfeiture and Waiver 
 
“The effect of failing to preserve an argument will 
depend upon whether the argument has been forfeited or 
waived.”19  Forfeiture is the “failure to make the timely 
assertion of a right.”20  Waiver is the “intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”21  Waived 
arguments about jury instructions may not be resurrected on 
appeal.22  When the argument was merely forfeited, however, 
                                              
19 Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 
F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2017). 
20 Id. at 147 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993)). 
21 Id. (citation omitted). 
22 Id. at 146 n.7.  
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plain error analysis applies,23 and we will reverse only where 
the error is “fundamental and highly prejudicial, such that the 
instructions failed to provide the jury with adequate guidance 
and our refusal to consider the issue would result in a 
miscarriage of justice.”24 
 
We find that First State’s actions below are more 
appropriately classified as waiver.  Throughout the history of 
this litigation, including in its early stages, First State was 
routinely confronted with Robinson’s “regarded as” case 
theory.  Not only did First State fail to object, it specifically 
assented to the jury instruction it now points to as erroneous. 
 
In 2016, First State moved for summary judgment, 
arguing, among other things, that Robinson could not establish 
that she was disabled under the terms of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.25  In response, and in her motion for summary 
judgment, Robinson argued that she only needed to establish 
that First State “regarded her” as disabled.26  Instead of 
correcting Robinson’s error of law, First State argued that there 
                                              
23 See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 
(3d Cir. 2011); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d). 
24 Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 
339 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
25 See Opening Brief in Support of First State’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Doc. 45), Robinson v. First State Cmty. 
Action Agency, 14 Civ. 1205 (RGA) (D. Del. 2014). 
26 Robinson SJ Br. at 8; Brief in Opposition to First State’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50) at 9–11, Robinson v. 
First State Cmty. Action Agency, 14 Civ. 1205 (RGA) (D. Del. 
2014). 
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was no evidence First State treated Robinson as though she had 
a “substantially limiting impairment.”27  The Magistrate Judge 
disagreed, and found that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because there was a question of material fact 
regarding whether First State considered Robinson disabled.28  
First State filed no objections to the Report and 
Recommendation, failing again to argue that a plaintiff could 
no longer proceed under a “regarded as” disability theory for 
reasonable accommodation claims.29 
 
Those failures, alone, would not be enough to waive the 
issue on appeal, but the viability of the “regarded as” case 
theory was squarely before First State again at trial.  At a 
conference outside the jury’s presence in December 2017, 
plaintiff’s counsel suggested that the relevant jury instruction 
include the four-part test from Williams v. Philadelphia 
Housing Authority Police Department on a failure to 
reasonably accommodate a plaintiff who was “regarded as” 
disabled.30  Defense counsel initially provided no views about 
                                              
27 See Brief in Opposition to Robinson’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Doc. 51) at 8, Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action 
Agency, 14 Civ. 1205 (RGA) (D. Del. 2014).  
28 See Report and Recommendation dated October 24, 2016 
(Doc. 56) at 8–10, Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action 
Agency, 14 Civ. 1205 (RGA) (D. Del. 2014). 
29 See Order dated November 17, 2016 (Doc. 57), Robinson v. 
First State Cmty. Action Agency, 14 Civ. 1205 (RGA) (D. Del. 
2014). 
30 In Williams, we concluded that the Americans with 
Disabilities Act as then codified entitled a plaintiff who was 
regarded as disabled to reasonable accommodations.  380 F.3d 
751, 775 (3d. Cir. 2004).  We set forth the following four 
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the jury charge.  That evening, plaintiff’s counsel sent an email 
clearly stating that “as we represented today, we are not 
arguing that Ms. Robinson has a disability.”31  The email also 
provided more concrete suggestions to include the Williams 
test in the instructions.  At the charge conference the next day, 
defense counsel voiced her support for Robinson’s proposed 
jury instruction, specifically saying that while she had not seen 
the new proposed language, she agreed that “it would be 
simpler if the accommodation claim is included” and that “the 
language about the failure to engage in the four-part test”—the 
language derived from Williams, which held that a “regarded 
as” plaintiff could pursue a reasonable accommodation 
claim—should be included.32  After First State was found liable 
                                              
elements for establishing that an employer breached its duty to 
provide reasonable accommodations:  “1) the employer knew 
about the employee’s disability; 2) the employee requested 
accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; 3) the 
employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the 
employee in seeking accommodations; and 4) the employee 
could have been reasonably accommodated but for the 
employer’s lack of good faith.”  Id. at 772 (citing Taylor v. 
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 319–20 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
The instructions given to the jury below modified those in 
Williams to reflect the entitlement of a “regarded as” plaintiff 
to a reasonable accommodation.  Those instructions correctly 
explained the law under our precedent in Williams, but the 
2008 Amendments abrogated Williams on that point. 
31 Email to the Court dated December 7, 2016 (Doc. 69), 
Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 14 Civ. 1205 
(RGA) (D. Del. 2014). 
32 J.A. 211–12.  Specifically, Stevens said, “Your Honor, I’m 
not exactly sure of how [Robinson] want[s] to change the 
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on Robinson’s reasonable accommodation claim, it moved for 
a new trial.  But it did not raise the error in that post-trial 
briefing, nor did it move for judgment as a matter of law on 
those grounds. 
 
This course of conduct evinces an intent to proceed 
under Robinson’s “regarded as” case theory and waive any 
objection based on the 2008 Amendments.  Our recent cases 
on waiver illustrate this point.  In Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Rosa, we found that a defendant’s “repeated 
acquiescence” to erroneous instructions did not rise to the level 
of a knowing and intentional waiver.33  But in United States v. 
Wasserson, we concluded that an alleged error was waived 
when the defendant failed to raise the objection at trial and 
failed to include it in his post-trial briefing.34  And, we have 
long held that when a party jointly recommends a jury 
instruction, it cannot later complain about that very 
instruction.35 Here, First State did not merely fail to object to 
                                              
instruction as proposed, but I think it would be simpler if the 
accommodation claim is included.  The language about the 
failure to engage in the four-part test that is used instead of 
setting out two separate tests.  I do think it could be set out with 
the four-prong test that is identified, I believe.  I think we’re 
talking about the same one.  I can consult with counsel to make 
sure we’re talking about the same one.”   
33 399 F.3d 283, 292–93 (3d Cir. 2005). 
34 418 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2005).  The defendant in that case 
also failed to raise the issue in his opening brief, which 
constituted a second ground to find waiver.  Id. at 240. 
35 See United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 97 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2008); see also United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1317 
(10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen a party ‘invites’ an error by 
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an instructional error at a charging conference; it played along 
with a flawed theory of liability throughout the litigation and 
ultimately endorsed the specific instruction embodying that 
theory.  First State was initially made aware in mid-2016 of the 
erroneous case theory and did nothing.  It did nothing again at 
the beginning of trial.  And finally, it invited the District Court 
to use the four-part test from Williams it now argues is 
incorrect.  Unfortunately for First State, it is simply too little, 
too late.  We therefore find that First State has waived its 
argument about the effect of the 2008 Amendments and will 
not review the instruction for plain error. 
 
2. The Effect of the Model Jury 
Instructions 
 
Although, for the reasons stated above, we conclude 
that First State’s argument regarding the reasonable 
accommodation jury instruction was waived, and thus need not 
review the instruction for plain error, the parties have devoted 
considerable attention in their briefing to the significance of 
the “Model Civil Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the 
Third Circuit,”36 which erroneously includes a “regarded as” 
                                              
suggesting that the court take particular action, we can presume 
that the party has acted voluntarily and with full knowledge of 
the material consequences.”). 
36 Model Instructions 9.1.3 and 9.2.1 have not been updated to 
reflect the 2008 Amendments to the ADA.  Instead, Instruction 
9.1.3, which provides the elements for a reasonable-
accommodation claim, states that a plaintiff must prove she 
“has a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA,” and cross-
references Instruction 9.2.1 for the definition of “disability.”  
Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions for Employment Claims 
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instruction, for a plain-error analysis.  In so doing, they expose 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the import of those 
instructions and the standard under which they are reviewed.  
Specifically, Robinson argues that because the flawed 
instruction appears in what are colloquially known as the 
“Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions,” the District Court 
could not have “plainly” erred in providing it to the jury.  As 
Robinson’s misunderstanding may be shared by others, we 
take this opportunity to correct it. 
 
Although entitled “Model Civil Jury Instructions for the 
District Courts of the Third Circuit,” these instructions are 
drafted not by members of this Court but by the Committee on 
Model Civil Jury Instructions, consisting of eight district court 
judges from districts within the Third Circuit, who also 
collaborate with the Committee’s reporters, two law 
professors.  Although the Committee’s work is partially funded 
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and made available on 
the Court’s website, the website clarifies that “neither the 
[Third Circuit] Court of Appeals nor any Judge of that Court 
                                              
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act at 17, available at 
https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/9_Chap_9_2018
_Oct.pdf.  Instruction 9.2.1, in turn, defines “disability” to 
include “not only those persons who actually have a disability, 
but also those who are ‘regarded as’ having a disability by their 
employer.”  Id. at 48.  The Comment to Model Instruction 9.1.3 
refers to Williams, and states that “an employee ‘regarded as’ 
having a disability is entitled to the same accommodation that 
he would receive were he actually disabled.”  Id. at 28.  The 
Comment to Model Instruction 9.2.1 uses the same language.  
Id. at 56. 
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participate[s] in the drafting of the Model Instructions.”37  
Given the care put into that drafting, we have observed it is 
unlikely “that the use of [a] model jury instruction can 
constitute error.”38  True enough, as far as probabilities go, but 
we have never held that use of such an instruction cannot 
constitute error, and a model jury instruction itself is neither 
law nor precedential.  Judges and parties are not free to 
incorporate incorrect legal principles simply because there is a 
similar error in these or any model jury instructions.  Model 
instructions are designed to help litigants and trial courts, not 
to replace their shared obligation to distill the law correctly 
when drafting proposed jury instructions.  Thus, the existence 
of the antiquated model jury instruction here, which regrettably 
does not yet reflect the 2008 Amendments, fails to provide a 
second justification for our decision to not review the relevant 
jury instruction.  
  
                                              
37Introduction to the Model Civil Jury Instructions, available 
at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/INTRODUCTI 
ON_2018_for_website.pdf. 
38 United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Admittedly, our language has not always been as precise as it 
could be, perhaps contributing to the confusion.  For example, 
we have referred to the model instructions on occasion as “our 
own.”  Id.  As indicated, however, the model jury instructions 
do not bear the imprimatur of this Court, and when parties use 
those instructions, they are reviewed like any other instructions 
for their correctness, both on plenary review and plain-error 
review. 
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B. The Statutory Damages Cap 
 
First State also argues that the inclusion of the $50,000 
statutory damages cap was error. Because First State did not 
object during trial, we review for plain error.39  We agree with 
the District Court that the instruction was given in error but that 
such error was harmless.  
 
The pertinent statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2), provides 
that a court “shall not inform” the jury of statutory damages 
limitations.  The District Court’s instruction did just that, and 
the instruction was error.  The question for us, then, is whether 
that error was so fundamental and prejudicial that a failure to 
review it would constitute a miscarriage of justice.40  
  
 First State points to a single Fourth Circuit opinion that 
lends some credence to its argument that an erroneous 
instruction on statutory damages might constitute error, but 
falls far short of convincing us that there was plain error in this 
                                              
39 First State’s attorney did raise questions about whether or 
not the damages cap should be included in the jury instructions.  
But while First State points this out, it neglects to mention that 
its attorney did not actually object to the charge, and instead 
said “I don’t know.  I just read it as a rule.  I didn’t know if it 
was the rule to be followed. . . .  I’m comfortable with [the 
instruction].”  J.A. 184.  When an attorney admits to 
uncertainty about the propriety of the charge and fails to 
actually object, the requirements of Rule 51(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have not been met, and the instruction 
is reviewed under the plain error standard.  See Collins v. Alco 
Parking Corp., 448 F.3d 652, 655–56 (3d Cir. 2006). 
40 Collins, 448 F.3d at 656. 
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case.  In Sasaki v. Class, an attorney mentioned the damages 
cap during closing argument.41  On review, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that “when a jury’s damages award itself indicates . 
. . strongly that the error substantially influenced the jury’s 
verdict, the error cannot be dismissed as harmless.”42  But there 
are two key distinctions between Sasaki and the instant matter.  
First, because the defendant’s attorney objected at trial, the 
error was preserved.43  Second, the court found evidence that 
the jury had responded to the erroneous disclosure by adjusting 
its award—namely, the jury awarded $50,000 (the highest 
amount within the damages cap) on the plaintiff’s federal 
claims and $150,000 on her state law claims, despite the fact 
that “[a]ll of the conduct that formed the basis for [the] state 
claims also provided the basis for [the] federal claims.”44  Here, 
however, First State presents no evidence that learning of the 
damages cap affected the jury’s decisionmaking.  Indeed, the 
jury awarded Robinson $22,501, which was well below the 
statutory cap in any event. 
 
While the inclusion of the statutory cap language was 
error, we cannot see how there was any prejudice to First State 
as a result, much less prejudice that, if left uncorrected, would 
work a manifest injustice.  We therefore conclude that there 
was no plain error. 
  
                                              
41 92 F.3d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 1996). 
42 Id. at 237.  
43 Id. at 235.  
44 Id. at 237. 
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C. Robinson’s Testimony about the 
Commission 
 
Finally, we review First State’s objection to Robinson’s 
testimony about the outcome of her complaint before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.  We review the 
District Court’s denial of a new trial on these grounds for abuse 
of discretion.  An abuse of discretion occurs when a lower 
court’s decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law 
to fact.”45  
  
First State argues that it was improperly prejudiced by 
Robinson’s disclosure that the Commission ruled in her favor.  
The District Court agreed that Robinson’s testimony was 
inadmissible and promptly struck it from the record.  She 
instructed the jury that they were not to consider it in their 
liability determination. First State does not explain why this 
course of conduct was insufficient, except that it speculates 
that Robinson’s statement “likely played a part” in the jury’s 
verdict.46  For two reasons, we disagree. 
 
First, as the District Court noted, the jury returned a split 
verdict.  Had the jurors been under the impression that they 
should find First State liable because the Commission found in 
Robinson’s favor, it does not follow that this prejudice would 
manifest itself only in the reasonable accommodation verdict 
and not the termination verdict. 
                                              
45 P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 
2006) (quoting Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 
F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
46 Appellant’s Br. at 22. 
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Second, we presume that jurors follow the instructions 
given to them by the trial court.47  That presumption is only 
overcome where there is an “overwhelming probability” that 
the jury was unable to follow the instructions and a likelihood 
that the evidence wrongfully admitted was “devastating” to the 
other party.48  There is simply no evidence here that the jury 
considered Robinson’s testimony after receiving the curative 
instruction, nor is there a likelihood that the consideration of 
Robinson’s testimony would have been “devastating” to First 
State.  We therefore conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that a new trial was not 
warranted on these grounds.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.    
                                              
47 Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2014). 
48 Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (quoting 
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987); Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968)). 
